I'll write a future post about my spontaneous three week trip to beautiful Nepal, where I went on a trek up to Annapurna Base Camp with an old friend. Hopefully I can post my elective essay in which I analyzed the barriers and drivers of rural electrification in Nepal. I just have to wait until my paper makes it's way through the University grading scheme.
Our professors are pushing us to finalize our dissertation proposals and today we had to present what we intend to research. I am very excited about my topic and especially happy to have finally settled on a subject.
As I haven't had time to write anything personal for this blog recently, I am posting my dissertation literature review below.
Research Question
How to pre-empt water disputes from
escalating in arid irrigation communities?
The example of Valencia's Water Tribunal
- Water disputes due to scarce resources and improper
management can escalate to violence and destabilize entire regions.
o
Climate change, socioeconomic and
political pressures can put increased pressure on already water stressed areas.
- Conflict intervention can occur at different levels of
intervention.
o
Prevention, Management and
Resolution can occur formally and informally at individual or community levels.
- Informal intervention at a community level in the framework of a recognized formal institution might be the most efficient way to prevent conflict from escalating.
Introduction
Conflict
is often viewed as harmful, but by not viewing it as innately negative and
seizing the opportunity to properly manage disputes in a transparent and open
manner, tensions and injustices can be deescalated through constructive
communication and lead to human development and social equality (Funder et al
2012). Conflicts over natural resources are often the root of violence within
impoverished areas and by learning from successful conflict resolution models,
we may avert the escalation of violence in zones that are disproportionately
impacted by climate change, socioeconomic injustices and political instability
where people risk losing their livelihoods (Funder et al 2012). Climate change
may be viewed as a conflict multiplier, as it triggers or aggravates underlying
tensions over limited, non-substitutable natural resources such as water
supplies (Funder et al 2012). Water disputes between and within states can
arise due to scarcity of the resource and improper management and allocation,
though in many cases it is poor governance of a scarce resource that leads to
conflict (Carius et al 2004). Conflicts over water can arise not only from the
relative scarcity of water and its mismanagement, but also from the impacts of
water development such as irrigation and lead to conflicts between urban and
rural populations (Gleick 1993). Violence that comes from water disputes is
more frequently seen on a local scale, instead of an international level and
these disputes can interfere with development and human welfare, sometimes
impacting stability at regional and national levels (Gleick 1993 Carius et al
2004).
In some cases of
water conflict, international law may play a role, but the creation of these
laws is complex due to national politics, regional practices, various
socioeconomic factors and economic pressures (Gleick 1993). Finding ways to
avoid conflict from escalating beyond regional levels seems to be the most
efficient way of targeting water disputes. It is important to study and
understand institutions that are designed to address disputes between water
resource users as well as institutions that manage and allocate water. When
these institutions are combined, I propose that we see successful, resilient
and sustainable community resource management, wherein informal interventions
are able to prevent and resolve conflict.
The resilience and
robustness of water management institutions is crucial in building a path to
productive conflict resolution that includes confidence, cooperation and
prevention of future conflict (Carius et al 2004). Water allocation can be a
highly contested issue, especially with regards to the urban versus agriculture
tug of war (Carius et al 2004). Worldwide, subsistence and small scale
commercial agriculture is a major source of livelihoods and as climate change
and urbanization make water supplies more unpredictable and scarce, farmers
migrate to urban centres in a search for income and fall into a cycle of
poverty (Carius et al 2004). This cycle of poverty can exacerbate conflict at
various levels of society and has been linked to civil wars (Carius et al
2004). Globally, there are many countries that need to strengthen their water
regulation policies and invest in capacity building in order to prevent water
disputes and mitigate conflict (Carius et al 2004). It is important to find
examples of systems that successfully address conflict and draw out the
appropriate lessons to adapt them to other areas at risk.
To properly
understand conflicts, it is important to review three factors: the root causes
of the resource conflict, the mechanisms used to address conflict and the level
at which intervention may occur (Funder 2012). For the scope of this research,
these factors will be limited to provide a deeper investigation of water
conflict intervention in one area. The main root cause of conflict will be
limited to and framed as water scarcity and its distribution in accordance with
local water rights. The mechanisms that will be investigated will be the
prevention (early warnings, direct prevention and structural prevention),
management (containment, bounding and mitigation) and resolution (negotiation,
mediation, facilitation and arbitration) of conflict at a regional level.
The study area
The Turia River of
Eastern Spain was diverted through the city of Valencia and today rarely
reaches the sea due to overextraction in the upstream reaches and increasing
droughts brought about by climate change (Boelens et al 2009). The Turia is the
source of water that is divided between acequias,
or communally operated irrigation canals, the users of which form irrigation
communities (Boelens et al 2009). The acequias
lie on the outskirts of Valencia in an area called La Huerta de Valencia and
are currently at risk of being overtaken by urban sprawl, having already
diminished from 12,000ha to 4,600ha (Boelens et al 2009). Irrigation
communities are composed of landowners who hold titles within the acequias and their primary responsibility is to act as administrators of
water allocation for irrigation from the main canal (Boelens et al 2009). Water
allocation is an important, well-managed and well-supervised operation because
the region is under water stress (Boelens et al 2009). Water is allocated by filas which are a measure of volume that varies based on the amount of
water present in the canals (Boelens et al 2009). The inherited rights to water are related to the size of the
land and each side of the river is entitled to water on different days of the
week (Boelens et al 2009). Each acequia has its
own regulations for allocation, maintenance, fee collection and various
administrative affairs (Boelens et al 2009).
The Water Tribunal
The
internationally recognized Tribunal de las Aguas, or Water Tribunal of
Valencia, is a UNESCO heritage site that communally manages its nine irrigation
canals that are divided into 8 acequias (Boelens
et al 2009). The Tribunal, having existed for over 1000 years, may be viewed as
outdated, but its role in water allocation and water dispute intervention make
it a model for problem solving in increasingly arid agricultural areas (Green
2008, Boelens et al 2009). It exists in parallel with the Spanish legal system
as an example of an established, public legal forum (Green 2008). The water
court features swift dispute resolution based on regionally specific
regulations (Green 2008).
The Tribunal has
eight sindicos who must be “honest farmers”, one
from each of the eight acequias: Quart,
Benacher-Faitenar, Favara, Robella, Tormos, Mestella, Mislata-Xirivella and
Rascana (Boelens et al 2009). The irrigation communities are responsible for
carrying out the verdicts decreed by the elected jury of the Tribunal (Boelens
et al 2009). Elected officials represent their acequia and a sindico is elected to sit on
the water Tribunal, with new elections held every two to three years (Boelens
et al 2009). A community respected guarda has
the responsibility of enforcing water allocation, managing the irrigation
canals, reporting to the Tribunal and acting as a mediator between neighbours
during disputes (Boelens et al 2009). The court’s narrow scope is one of the
reasons for its long historical success, but may also be its downfall as
Valencia’s expansion threatens to take over the land over which it presides
(Green 2008). Local regulations and plans such as the Territorial Action
Plan for the Protection of the Huerta Valencia are
attempting to protect the Tribunal by emphasizing its inherent value as part of
local culture and customs (Generalitat Valenciana 2009). For the last several hundred years, the
Tribunal has convened every Thursday at noon to arbitrate water related
conflicts (Green 2008).
Local conflict
Conflicts may
arise from infringements upon water rights and laws. These contentions are
brought before the tribunal and divided into four categories: farmer to farmer,
farmers to third parties, acequia to acequia and confederation level (Boelens et al 2009). The actual number of
cases brought before the Tribunal is rather small, with an average of ten to
twelve cases per year and a total of thirty five cases in the first decade of
the millennium (Boelens et al 2009). However, this does not mean that conflict
is not occurring; it is simply being diverted before it escalates.
Two types of
problems exist between farmers: lack of maintenance that causes other farmers
to receive less water and farmers that take more water than their entitlement.
Generally, maintenance problems are solved informally, outside of court by the guarda’s intervention (Boelens et al 2009). As for water overuse problems,
the enforcement of water allocation prevents the majority of disputes, but when
they arise they too are solved informally by the guarda (Boelens et al 2009). Issues that arise between farmers and third
parties are mainly between farmer and municipality based on concession and
administration non-compliance, rights entitlements and non-compliance to
obligations and responsibilities of land-use guidelines (Boelens et al 2009).
Similar to the cases between farmers, often the guarda solves the dispute before it gets to the Tribunal though in some
cases the conflict escalates and requires formal arbitration in the water court
(Boelens et al 2009). The guarda is the main
intervener in these two categories of water dispute, informally solving
conflicts through prevention, management and resolution.
When problems
escalate beyond the power of the guarda, the
parties are brought to the Tribunal and formal conflict resolution occurs. The
Tribunal is also tasked with resolving general water problems and so disputes
between acequias are allegedly solved in the
post-Tribunal private meetings attended by the elected sindicos (Boelens et al 2009). The confederation allocates water to the
Huertas,, which is turn allocated to the acequias by the Tribunal (Boelens et al 2009). Any problems at this level
will be dealt with in the private meetings that follow the public portion of
the court proceedings (Boelens et al 2009). The court deals with disputes at a
higher level of management through prevention by good governance and fair
allocation, resolution by arbitration and through negotiation between authorities.
Formal and Informal Processes
Spanish formal law
recognizes the Water Tribunal to the extent that regular courts will not take
on a case that has not passed first through the guarda and then through the court (Green 2008, Boelens et al 2009). The legal
support granted to these irrigation communities has favoured their permanence
and has led to them becoming models for other regions of the world (Casalduero
and Viqueira 2007). Most cases are solved at an informal level by the guarda thanks to the authority and legitimacy that the Tribunal has by
simple virtue of existing as a formal body (Boelens et al 2009). The Tribunal
seems to hold legitimacy and respect from the point of view of farmers who are
aware of its role in protecting and representing farmers against third parties
such as companies or the municipality that may have wronged them (Boelens et al
2009).
The Tribunal acts
as a quick and inexpensive mechanism for addressing water rights disputes
through prevention by proper water allocation to farmers, management through
reinforcing customary water rights and resolution through mediation or
negotiation at the community level and arbitration through the water court (Boelens
et al 2009). The public aspect of the Tribunal encourages dispute resolution at
a low-level to avoid disgrace or embarrassment of appearing in court, thus
preventing conflicts from escalating by simply existing and having authority
and prestige (Boelens et al 2009). The informal methods of addressing conflict
are mainly carried out by the guardas who act as
a first line of defence. Factors that must not be overlooked in this system are
the importance of community, social networks and relationships in the long-term
sustainability and success of water resource management and dispute resolution.
Community level methods of resource management are likely to be more successful
in the long term and in the case of the Huertas of Valencia, the management of
water resources includes community dispute resolution (McGinnis et al 1999).
This research aims
to contribute to understanding the informal conflict prevention, management and
resolution processes that occur at a local level through the guardas as community mediators within the framework of a recognized and
respected regional conflict resolution system, the Tribunal de las Aguas. The
aim is to find lessons that can be adapted to areas under water stress that are
at risk of escalating conflict.
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